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RECENT DECISIONS
as above.8 By way of explanation the Restatement of the Law of Torts
says:
"The actor's conduct must be a substantial factor in subjecting
the other to fear or other emotional disturbance. Furthermore,
the act done must be a normal response to the fear or distur-
bance. If after the event, and knowing that the fear or distur-
bance has been created, the act done or its impulsions appear
highly extraordinary it is not a normal response to fear or
disturbance."9
It must be remembered that in determining whether this act was
"normal" or not, the court or jury is looking back at the event and
knows the situation, including the character of the one subjected to the
stimulus, and decides from these facts whether the act was extraor-
dinary or not.10 Under this definition of "normal," as opposed to extra-
ordinary, defendant Butler's act might be considered normal. Certain-
ly he was acting in response to a stimulus of fear caused in the first
instance by Knudsen's act. It might well be argued that this reaction
in a supposed emergency was not an efficient intervening cause, but
merely a reaction to a stimulus, in itself incapable of breaking the chain
of causation.
DANIEL C. CORCORAN
Torts-Right of Privacy-"The Saturday Evening Post" published
an article entitled "Never Give a Passenger a Break." The author,
joined as a defendant, was merciless in his ridicule of taxicab drivers
in Washington, D.C. He pictured them as dishonest opportunists, ever
ready to overcharge a patron not thoroughly familiar with the compli-
cated zone system. The plaintiff was an operator of a taxicab, and her
photograph was used to illustrate the article in question. Plaintiff's
name was not mentioned in the text. She sued for damages for libel
and for a violation of her "right of privacy" by reason of the publica-
tion of the photograph. The case was heard on defendant's motion to
dismiss the complaint on grounds of insufficiency. Held: "Publication
of a photograph of a private person without his sanction, unless by
reason of his position or achievements he has become a public character,
constitutes a violation of the 'right of privacy,' for which an action
for damages will lie." Peay v. Curtis Publishing Company et al, (D.C.,
D.C., 1948) 78 F. Supp. 305; Fowler v. Curtis Publishing Company
et al, (D.C., D.C., 1948) 78 F. Supp. 303.
This decision adds another jurisdiction to the growing weight of
authority that there is such a thing as the "right of privacy," a right
8 Fn. 4, supra.
9 Restatement of the Law of Torts, Sec. 444 (c).
10 Fn. 4,supra.
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first discussed by Warner and Brandeis in 1890.1 The question was
open in this jurisdiction, as it was not definitely answered in Elnhurst
v. Pearson,2 decided in 1945.
It is stated by the authorities that this right was unknown at com-
mon law, and this is explained by the statement that the law is not
static, but changes and develops to meet new conditions of life. In
early Anglo-Saxon history, the courts were more interested in pro-
tecting life and property than providing a remedy against the sting
of ridicule. This did not mean that such a right did not exist, but
rather that first things were put first. As the law grew and developed
with civilization more attention was given naturally to the other in-
terests of men, previously not protected by law. At first, any recovery
was based on a right of property, breach of trust, or nuisance, in an
attempt to fit a new concept into an already existing category. The
result was a multitude of decisions, notable for circuitous reasoning.
The first "break" came in 1902 in New York in a famous four to
three decision,- denying the right of privacy. The strong dissenting
minority view came to be law through decisions in most states,4 and
statutes5 covering a limited number of aspects in others. In 1904, in
an elaborate and well considered opinion, The Supreme Court of
Georgia in Pavesick v. New England Life Insurance Company, unan-
imously adopted the minority view in the New York decision. The
language of the Georgia case is quoted at length in the instant decision.
It is interesting to note that the circuitous reasoning of the earlier cases
is being discarded, and the basis of the right of privacy is found in
the natural moral law.
"The right of privacy has its foundations in the instincts of
nature. It is recognized intuitively, consciousness being the wit-
ness that can be called to establish its existence. Any person
whose intellect is in a normal condition recognizes at once that
as to each individual member of society there are matters pri-
vate, and there are matters publis so far as the individual is con-
cerned. Each individual as instinctively resents and encroach-
ment by the public upon his rights which are of a private nature
as he does the withdrawal of those of his rights which are of
1 Warner and Brandeis, "Right of Privacy," 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
2 80 U.S. App. D.C. 372, 153 F. (2d) 467 (1945).
3 Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Company, 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442, 59
L.R.A. 478, 89 Am. St. Rep. 828 (1902).
4 For a complete history and background of the "right of privacy," see 138
A.L.R. 27; 39 Mich. L. Rev. 526.
5 Sec. 50, Civil Rights Law, Consolidated Laws of N.Y., C.6.
6 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68, 69 L.R.A. 101, 106 Am. St. Rep. 104, 2 Ann. Cas. 561
(1904).
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a public nature, A right of privacy in matters purely private
is therefore derived from natural law." 7
To date there are only three states in the Union and District of
Columbia which have not, in some form, recognized an enforceable
right of privacy. Michigan, a long holdout since Atkinson v. John E.
Doherty & Company," is now definitely committed to the majority
view by the recent case of Pallas v. Crowley Milner & Company,9
which also involved the unauthorized use of plaintiff's photograph.
Rhode Island"° has expressly considered and unequivocally repudiated
enforcement of the right. Washington' had a clear cut opportunity to
invoke the doctrine in an instance where the plaintiff, daughter of an
embezzler, sued for damages for the unauthorized use of her photo-
graph in a newspaper account of her father's escapades. The Court
admitted the right, but denied the remedy, following Rhode Island.
Wisconsin is apparently committed to the same view since Judevine v.
Benzies-Montayne Fuel & Warehouse Company,12 a case where the
defendant advertised a debt of $4.32 owing from plaintiff for sale.
Justice Fowler, after an admitted cursory examination of the author-
ities, concluded that it was for the Legislature to enforce such a right.
Comments on the case since that time indicate that Wisconsin is defi-
nitely with the minority group."3 The case does not go that far. There
is earlier authority in Wisconsin supporting the majority view. In
Schultz v. Frankfort Marine Accident & Plate Glass Company,"4 the
plaintiff was allowed a recovery for defendant's act of causing plain-
tiff to be kept under constant surveillance by detectives to his public
embarrassment and ridicule. Justice Timlin said:
"A conspiracy to libel plaintiff or to commit any other wrong
to his person, reputation ,or property may, when damage fol-
lows, be the subject of a civil action."' 5
Although Wisconsin is said to be on the minority side of the ledger,
in view of recent decisions in other jurisdictions, Wisconsin may join
the weight of authority in a proper case.
FREDERIcK A. MILLER
7Ibid at p. 194, at p. 69 of 50 S.E., quoted at p. 307 of 78 F. Supp.
8 121 Mich. 372, 80 N.W. 285, 46 L.R.A. 219, 80 Am. St. Rep. 507, (1899).
9 33 N.W. (2d) 911 (1948).
10 Henry v. Cherry and Webb, 30 R.I. 13, 73 A. 97, 24 L.R.A., (ns) 991, 136 Am.
I St. Rep. 928, 18 Ann. Cas. 1006 (1909).
21 Hillman v. Star Publishing Company, 64 Wash. 691, 117 P. 594, 35 L.R.A.,
(ns) 595 (1911).
12222 Wis. 512, 525, 269 N.W. 295, 106 A.L.R. 1443 (1936), noted in 38 Wis. L_
Rev. 140, 1947 Wis. L. Rev. 467.
is Ibid.
14 151 Wis. 537, 139 N.W. 386, 43 L.R.A., (ns) 520 (1913).15 Ibid.
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